Voice of Restlessness

Monday, October 17, 2005

Does Jamaah Islamiah (JI) Exist?

A question “Does Jamaah Islamiah (JI) exist?” is still lingering thus far on the mind of Indonesians. Mostly Indonesians, I happen among them, hardly believe such organization has rooted in the society. Piqued by curiosity about JI, I get confirmation from Asrori S. Karni, a leading Indonesian journalist, whom stated that JI does exist. Interestingly, he analyzed that the recent Bali Bombing II is not an official program of the organization. It was carried out without a direction from higher profiles, instead as a result of unruliness among younger members. What is actually happening within the organization?

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In spite of abundance materials about Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia, range from Sidney Jones, to Zachary Abuza, and to Ken Conboy, a question “Does Jamaah Islamiah (JI) exist?” is still lingering thus far on the mind of Indonesians. Mostly Indonesians, I happen among them, hardly believe such organization has rooted in the society. It may well be due to the long span of Suharto’s rule which relatively success in tamping it down to certain position. Such organization and its ilk run underground. Azyumardi Azra, a moderate Islamic scholar and rector of the State Islamic University in Jakarta, argues that the speed societal change since the fall of dictator Suharto in 1998, and combination of poverty, has left many young Muslims alienated and receptive to the messages of global jihad. “The recruiters are good at brainwashing disoriented people and finding their weakness,” as he further says it. (Time, Oct 17, 2005)

The splicing Bali Bombing with JI is still unaccepted reality among Indonesians. Hidayat Nurwahid, the President of PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), the Ikhwanul Muslimin of Indonesia, opposed to any linkage the Bali Bombing II to Islamic terrorism. He put in apology, it was not carried out by Islamic terrorist since there is no terrorism within Islam. In addition, according to common Indonesians, the Bali Bombing is a result of international conspiracy to undermine Indonesia --to some extent, toward Islam. Strikingly, some said Indonesian government alone carried out the bombing to deflect growing demonstration in the wake of soaring up fuel prices.

This is not of interest if that laymen put it, but it came up on the mind of Vice President Yusuf Kalla. Recently he stated that JI doesn’t exist. As a second highest leader in Indonesia whose unlimited access to any highly classified works of Intelligence, his statement leaves us many questions. It is indeed to substantiate the lingering question. But I am questioning the Vice President’s statement as a smoldering gun swirled in Bali Bomb I, Marriot Hotel, Australian Embassy, and recent Bali Bomb II. The violent bombing killing innocent people is the evident to the existence of terrorist in Indonesia.

Piqued by curiosity about JI, I get confirmation from Asrori S. Karni, a leading Indonesian journalist, whom stated that JI does exist. He interviewed several members whom have sworn allegation (bai’at) to the organization and being important persons in local structure of JI. Interestingly, he analyzed that the recent Bali Bombing II is not an official program of the organization. It was carried out without a direction from higher profiles, instead as a result of unruliness among younger members. What is actually happening within organization? This question needs an elaborate study. In fact, JI splits into a radical wing and a less radical one.

Simply put, the existence of JI is an unquestionable fact. It leaves Indonesian Government into consideration whether to ban it or not. Rohan Gunaratna, the author of Combating Terrorism, propounds suggestion that Asian governments need to fight terror on multiple fronts. AS far as Indonesia concerns, he states that Indonesia should enact stern counter-terrorism laws. Indonesia should ban JI, enabling the country’s security agencies to move decisively against it. Indonesia should clean up the radical madrasahs that breed extremist, subjecting them to tougher law enforcement and pressure Muslim religious and educational organizations to police them. According to me, cleaning up the radical madrasahs is not the sole solution. Rather, the empowerment of existing madrasahs belongs to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is very much needed.
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Monday, December 20, 2004

Issues of the NU

In the wake of muktamar (convention), Nov. 28 - Dec. 2, 2004, Donohudan, Surakarta, the split within Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was looming. Does religious reason motivate it? Here is my answer to Mr. Fabio Scarpello

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Dear Pak Fabio Scarpello,


Since I am a member of NU, I am glad to answer your questions and to discuss some points of current issues of NU. We know that the NU would be splitted into two different organizations. The first is NU of Hasyim Muzadi, which we call it --in Indonesian-- as 'NU struktural'. And, the second would be of Gus Dur, or 'NU kultural'.

Q- What do you think is the effect of such a splitting in the world's largest Islamic organization?

A- In fact, over a couple of decades, NU has always been splitted into two or more different organizations. All of them happened as the result of conventions. In 1979s, at the Muktamar of Semarang, some unsatisfied factions created a separate organization, which has been tittled as Ittihadul Muballighiin (group of preachers) by late KH Syaikhu. This Ittihadul Muballighin now is under KH Syukron Makmun. The organization, as of now, still exists.

In 1994, Abu Hassan, the contender to Gus Dur at the Muktamar of Cipasung --who has been allegedly supported and backed by the then regime of Soeharto-- also created his own organization, which had same name of that of Gus Dur's. This now defunct organization cannot attract more people to join.

Q- What if the split takes place once again in the hand of Gus Dur, what is the effect of such a splitting?

A- To this question, I cannot give a precise answer. It could be doom, or perhaps it would be a good thing. If Gus Dur still bears the same name of the NU of Hasyim, it could be a doom. NU of Hasyim, however, is the legal NU, since he was ellected by the attendants of Muktamar (convention), no matter how tricky it was. But, if Gus Dur bears the different name, it could be a well augur for the future of Islam and, surely, of NU. How could it be? Gus Dur could make his new organization similar to that of the above-mentioned KH Syaikhu's Ittihadul Muballighin. The latter organization concentrates in Dakwah. So, Gus Dur could run his organization on a cultural track or on an educational and intellectual line.

I already sent email to Gus Dur's secretary --as I learned, he was one of the four persons who have been named by Gus Dur to prepare everything ahead of the creation of his own organization--, asking: what kind of the organization would be. As yet, I do not receive any answers, he must be busy.

Q- Is the splitting really motivated by religious reasons or is it just a way used by Gus Dur to get back at Muzadi who did not support him in his political career?

A- I wonder, is Gus Dur's vigourous opposition to Hasyim Muzady as a result of his vendetta? It could be so. At first, the opposition is due to Muzadi's unwillingness to issue a taushiyah (recommendation) to mobilize the members of NU toward PKB, Gus Dur's party. Hasyim's refutal was ahead of the recent general election. It was due to Hasyim's intention to run in the presidential election long before the legislative election. He was aware that the position of chairman of NU could lead him into presidential palace. Meanwhile, at the first day Gus Dur was deposed from presidential chair, Gus Dur also stated that he will re-run in the presidential election. This intention of Gus Dur was an impediment to Hasyim. Hence, Hasyim did not issue any recommendation to PKB, to recommend members of NU to cast their votes for the PKB. Hasyim was aware that his candidacy could not be through PKB, the then political wing of the NU, for PKB completely supported and nominated Gus Dur as its presidential candidate.

Q- Is the splitting really motivated by religious reasons?

A- I do not think so. And, situation got worst, as the unsatisfied younger of NU members has used Gus Dur as an icon of struggle during the convention. For, Gus Dur had his own agenda, and at the same time, he also carried the political vendetta of PKB toward Hasyim, I saw, everything was getting complicated. They were defeated by Hasyim Muzadi.

Q- What is the real importance --as a religious and as a political organization-- of NU in today's Indonesia?

A- NU is the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia. It covers around 35 million members, as some scholars said. But, it could be more than that, in between of 50s to 75s million. With this large member, from the Reformation era onward, the NU is a significant social and a political capital. Interestingly. Saiful Mujani has noted down on his doktoral thesis, that the member of NU has a feeling of closeness to the organization far higher than that of Muhammadiyah, by 50% and 20% respectively. This feeling, as the thesis pointed out, is the highest one among other Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Now, we can imagine how powerful the NU is.

Q- Since, NU is the most moderate Islamic organization; can the split play in the hands of those wanting a more rigid implementation of the Islamic teachings?

A- Indeed, the split could fell in the hands of those wanting rigid implementation of Islamic teaching. No doubt, the recent convention of Boyolali has been used in the hand of the conservative camp of ulemas to sideline the younger progressive proponents. The conservative ulemas urged NU not to accommodate all proponents of Liberal Islam within any structure of NU, from Center to downward.

And Hasyim, for the sake of making ever stronger his current incumbency, no doubt, wittingly adopts the voice of conservative ulemas. In turn, progressive vision of Islam would be sidelined. And conservative view would prevail. This point of view is a matter of concern of younger NU. And in the long run, NU could more likely lean toward that of opposing to the Western --among the others, as a fundamentalist Islam did. It is indeed scaring me.
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Wednesday, November 24, 2004

The NU convention and nonconventional Islam

The convention (Muktamar) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which will be held from Nov. 28 to Dec. 2 in Donohudan, Surakarta is a focal point for the future of progressive Islam in Indonesia. The very fact that Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim nation, and the NU is the biggest Islamic organization in the country, leads to the assumption that progressive Islam, which is the main characteristic of Indonesian Islam, would be at stake, if the views of progressive Islam are rejected during the convention. How could it be?

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The NU convention and nonconventional Islam

Rizqon Khamami, New Delhi.

The Jakarta Post
Opinion and Editorial - November 24, 2004

The convention (Muktamar) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) which will be held from Nov. 28 to Dec. 2 in Donohudan, Surakarta is a focal point for the future of progressive Islam in Indonesia. The very fact that Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim nation, and the NU is the biggest Islamic organization in the country, leads to the assumption that progressive Islam, which is the main characteristic of Indonesian Islam, would be at stake, if the views of progressive Islam are rejected during the convention.

Within the NU, the idea of progressive Islam is held by several young intellectuals. For instance, Liberal Islam is upheld by Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Moqsith Ghazali through the Liberal Islam Network (JIL). Other elements of progressive Islam are included, but not limited to, Islam Emansipatopry (P3M), Islam Leftist (LKiS), Islam Indigenous (Khamami Zada), Islam International (Nadirsyah Hosen), Post-Traditional Islam (ISIS) and Islam Post Religion (Rumadi).

It can be safely stated that their views represent a new wave of emerging young intellectual Muslims during the last 10 years within NU. Despite their different approaches, they share a similar view that Islam should be reinterpreted in a moderate, contextual and progressive way.

However, all the discourses are not without hindrance. The idea of progressive Islam has been criticized by several conservative ulema. These ulema are of the opinion that discourse on progressive Islam is not only based on Western secular views but is also against the fundamental concept of NU's teachings in terms of its theology and legal interpretation.

By contrast, the conservative group interprets Islamic teachings in a textual and traditional way. They use the sources, opinions and methodology that have been issued by the ulema for centuries. They do not consider the fact that such views are unsuited to the current situation.

How will the upcoming convention be deemed a definitive moment? Thus far, the public have paid more attention to the struggle between the incumbent NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi and Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, former Indonesian president and former NU chairman, as a continuation of recent conflict between them during the presidential race.

Little attention has been drawn to the real challenge faced by the largest Muslim organization of whether to adopt a progressive line or to accommodate conservative views. The struggle between these two camps is more important than the personal conflict between Hasyim and Gus Dur. The failure of the progressive group to take a role in the NU would seriously damage the future of Islam in Indonesia.

In this sense, the most important issue which must be addressed during the Muktamar is the renewal of Islamic legal methodology, which it is argued should constitute a fresh and highly promising theoretical construct and represent a new holistic and contextual approach to legal language and legal interpretation.

The NU will need to reduce their dependence on the old methodology, which is a product of the sociological structure of classical and medieval Muslim societies. In other words, they need to develop new interpretations of original sources while studying the interpretations of the past, both to learn from their insights and to understand them as products of their historical environment.

Above all, the course of progressive Islam basically is dependent on Syuriah (the advisory council within NU). This is the real powerful structure of NU. It consists of the most prominent ulema. During several decades, particularly during the tenure of Gus Dur and of Hasyim Muzadi, this board had been trespassed by Tanfidziyah (the executive body). The proponents of progressive Islam suggest that restructuring the relationship between Syuriah and Tanfidziyah should strengthen the role of Syuriah. This is particularly important since Hasyim Muzadi allegedly used the NU for his own political interests during the 2004 presidential election. He was the running mate of former president Megawati Soekarnoputri in the election.

The appointment of Masdar F. Mas'udi as an acting executive chairperson of NU during the non-active tenure of Hasyim was to empower Syuriah. It is akin to the structure of the hierarchy of the pesantren (Islamic boarding school), in which the real leader is the kyai pengasuh pesantren (the owner of a pesantren), and Tanfidziyah is on par with lurah pondok (head of a pesantren) which are mostly taken from the most senior santri, rather than making an effort to 'modernize' the organization. Interestingly, the appointment indicates that the current Syuriah accepted the idea of progressive Islam since Masdar is widely known as one of the progressive Muslim thinkers.

During Musyawarah Besar (conference) of NU members in Ciwaringin, Cirebon, several young intellectuals of NU also decided to bring back the power to Syuriah. The intention, surely, is a means to bar Hasyim Muzadi or any politically leaning person from holding a key position in the executive board. It is also suggested that the upcoming election for the Tanfidziyah will be in the hands of the elected Syuriah. If the suggestion is accepted, NU will be able to stay away from political temptation as long as the Syuriah is able to ensure this. Does it suffice?

However, the young intellectuals are unaware of an immediate obstacle if the Syuriah holds back its power. In part, there is no guarantee that a progressive ulema such as K.H. Sahal Mahfudz will be reelected.

In the community of NU, every nodding of an ulema's head is very important, especially toward any new Islamic discourses, no matter how strange. So, whoever is elected as chairperson of the Syuriah board is the main person who will lead the organization and determine the future stream of Islam in regard to modernity and the wave of globalization.

So, the emerging voice of restlessness of young NU and their efforts to modernize Islam would not be smooth. It depends on whom the elected Syuriah will be. The young NU requires support of kyai who have a liberal vision of Islam.

Source: The Jakarta Post

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Comment: yaleglobal.yale.edu

Throughout Indonesian history, Islam emerged with a unique eclecticism differing from that of Arab lands. In recent years, however, political Islam has been on the march, with violent consequences for the world's most populous Muslim country. Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, Nehdlatul Ulama (NU), now prepares for a crucial meeting regarding the interpretation of shariah, Islamic law. Conservative scholars argue that progressive Islam, prevalent in Indonesia, is based on Western secularism and counters NU teachings. Younger progressives, however, argue that strict traditional interpretations are not relevant to modern times, and thus the laws should be adapted accordingly. According to The Jakarta Post, the outcome of this convention will determine "the future stream of Islam in regard to modernity and the wave of globalization." – YaleGlobal

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